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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
            
 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.     
 Norman Edwards appeals from an order denying his motion 
to suppress evidence used to convict him for his role in credit 
card fraud and theft.  Because we find that the evidence was 
obtained lawfully pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. 
Ct. 1868 (1968), we will affirm. 
I. 
   The Fairfield Township Police broadcasted an all-points 
transmission reporting a credit card fraud in progress at the 
Midlantic Bank in Fairfield, New Jersey.  While responding to the 
bank, Officer Crapello testified that he received a second radio 
message describing a red Chrysler LeBaron convertible with two 
occupants and New York license plate "ZPT777" as "believed to be 
involved or may be involved" in the suspected bank fraud. 
 Officer Crapello arrived at the bank approximately 
ninety seconds after the first message, and saw a red Chrysler 
LeBaron convertible in the bank parking lot bearing license plate 
ZPT777.  As the message had described, the car had two occupants, 
later determined to be defendant Edwards and one Anthony Sears.   
The convertible top was down, and both occupants were visible.  
 Officer Crapello pulled his patrol car in front of the 
LeBaron.  Officer Kane, in a second patrol car, boxed the LeBaron 
in from behind to prevent or inhibit an escape attempt.   
 Officer Crapello approached the passenger side of the 
LeBaron on foot, with the thumb snap of his holster released and 
his hand on his service revolver.  Officer Kane crouched behind 
his patrol car door.  A third patrol car arrived and Officer 
  
Polizzi and a police dog also approached the suspects' vehicle. 
 When Officers Crapello and Polizzi were approximately 
eight feet from the car, Polizzi instructed the dog to bark.  
Until then, both occupants of the LeBaron appeared to be 
sleeping.  In response to the dog's bark, Edwards lifted his 
head, looked around and then nudged Sears, who awoke with a 
start.   After instructing Edwards and Sears to put their hands 
on the dashboard, Crapello saw a jacket on Edwards' lap.  He 
reached in and removed the jacket.  When he patted the outside of 
the jacket to check the pockets for weapons, Crapello detected "a 
large, hard, bulky object" in its inner pocket.  He removed a 
manila envelope, folded once in half but not sealed, from the 
jacket.  Feeling the "hard, bulky" object in the envelope, 
Officer Crapello unfolded it and looked inside for a weapon.  
Instead of a weapon, he found several credit cards and New Jersey 
drivers' licenses, which he determined from visual inspection to 
be fraudulent.   
 Edwards was arrested and indicted for possession and 
use of counterfeit credit cards.  18 U.S.C. § 1029(a).  After an 
evidentiary hearing on Edwards' motion to suppress the evidence 
found in the manila envelope, the district court denied the 
motion.  United States v. Edwards, No. 92-590, slip op. at 9 
(D.N.J. June 8, 1993).  Apparently finding that the officers' 
actions did not constitute an arrest, id. at 6-8, the district 
  
court did not decide whether the officers had probable cause to 
arrest before they opened the manila envelope. 
II. 
A.  Terry Analysis 
 The district court held that Officer Crapello's actions 
in opening the envelope without a warrant were justified under 
Terry, supra.  A Terry stop is permissible when the police have a 
reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that a crime has 
been committed.  Id. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880-81.  Edwards does 
not argue that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct 
an investigatory Terry stop.  Instead, he argues that both the 
subsequent Terry protective pat down and the ultimate search of 
the envelope were unlawful. 
1. Reasonableness of the Frisk 
 First, Edwards argues that the police had no reason to 
believe he was armed and dangerous, and thus could not lawfully 
conduct a Terry protective pat down.  In Terry, the Supreme Court 
held that a police officer, during the course of a Terry stop, 
may conduct a "reasonable search for weapons for the protection 
of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is 
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual...."  Id. at 27, 
88 S. Ct. at 1883.  The test is "whether a reasonably prudent man 
in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his 
safety or that of others was in danger."  Id. (citations 
omitted).  Finally, in determining whether the officer acted 
  
reasonably under the circumstances, "due weight must be given, 
not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' 
but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to 
draw from the facts in light of his experience."  Id. (citations 
omitted). 
 We will accept the district court's factual findings 
regarding the circumstances of the stop unless they are clearly 
erroneous, and exercise plenary review over whether these facts 
so found, create a reasonable inference that the suspect is 
dangerous and the protective frisk was reasonably calculated to 
discover a weapon.  See United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 
654 (3d Cir. 1991).                     
 We find no error in the district court's conclusion 
that Officer Crapello had reason to believe that he could be 
facing armed and dangerous felons.  That this fraud occurred at a 
bank in broad daylight could lead one to believe that the 
perpetrators might have armed themselves to facilitate their 
escape if confronted.  Although the radio bulletin did not 
describe this response as a bank robbery, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the suspects might use force and be armed. 
    2. The Envelope Search 
 Edwards also argues that, even if the pat down was 
reasonable, it was not reasonable to open the envelope.  "The 
sole justification of the search in [a Terry stop] is the 
protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must 
  
therefore be confined to an intrusion, reasonably designed to 
discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the 
assault of the police officer."  Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S. Ct. 
at 1884.   
 We agree with the district court that Officer Crapello 
was justified in opening the envelope.  He was justifiably 
concerned that a small-caliber handgun might be concealed in the 
envelope.  Upon careful examination of the evidence in the 
record, we conclude that the district court was well within its 
discretion when it decided that Officer Crapello could reasonably 
have believed that a weapon might be concealed in the envelope.  
The four-by-six inch envelope was packed full of nineteen hard 
plastic cards -- whether credit cards or drivers' licenses -- 
which the record demonstrates created the feel of a hard, bulky 
object.  Moreover, the government presented the district court 
with tangible evidence that a small-caliber handgun, in its 
holster, fits inside the envelope and has roughly the same feel 
inside the envelope as did the credit cards it contained.  In the 
hasty examination necessitated by a protective search, Officer 
Crapello could reasonably have confused the square, bulky mass of 
credit cards and drivers' licenses for a small handgun sheathed 
in a square, leather holster that masked its outlines. 
B.  Did the Police Conduct Amount to an Arrest? 
 Edwards argues that the police conduct in this case, 
especially by boxing in the suspects' vehicle and by the overall 
  
display of force, transformed what began as a Terry stop into a 
de facto arrest.  Further, Edwards argues that the police lacked 
probable cause to make an arrest and hence could not lawfully 
seize the items in the manila envelope pursuant to a search 
incident to arrest.  Because we find that the police conduct in 
this case did not constitute an arrest, it is unnecessary for us 
to consider whether there was probable cause.   
 The Supreme Court has stated that, when police officers 
make an investigative stop, they may take such steps as are  
"reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to 
maintain the status quo."  United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 
221, 235, 105 S. Ct. 675, 684 (1985).  "Under the Terry cases, 
the reasonableness of the intrusion is the touchstone, balancing 
the need of law enforcement officials against the burden on the 
affected citizens and considering the relation of the policeman's 
actions to his reason for stopping the suspect."  Baker v. Monroe 
Township, No. 94-5069, 1995 WL 125470, at *4 (3d Cir. Mar. 22, 
1995).    
 The vast majority of courts have held that police 
actions in blocking a suspect's vehicle and approaching with 
weapons ready, and even drawn, does not constitute an arrest per 
se.  In United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 31 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 924, 102 S. Ct. 424 (1981), the court held 
that police officers' actions in blocking the defendant's car 
with their cruisers and approaching with guns drawn did not 
  
amount to an arrest, but instead constituted a reasonable Terry 
stop in response to an anonymous tip concerning drug activity.  
See also United States v. Perea, 986 F.2d 633, 644 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(blocking suspect's car with three unmarked cars and approaching 
with weapons drawn was not an arrest); United States v. Lechuga, 
925 F.2d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 1991) ("sandwiching" suspects' car 
with unmarked police cars and one officer approaching with his 
gun drawn was not an arrest); United States v. Jackson, 918 F.2d 
236 (1st Cir. 1990) (blocking suspect's vehicle with two police 
cruisers, approaching with guns drawn, ordering suspects to put 
their hands on dashboard and subsequently frisking them did not 
constitute arrest); United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 637 
(8th Cir.) (officers' actions in blocking vehicle, approaching 
with guns drawn and ordering suspect out of car was not an 
arrest), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837, 106 S. Ct. 113 (1985). 
 While Edwards emphasizes the fact that he was not "free 
to leave" the scene, this does not mark the point where a Terry 
stop escalates into an arrest, since in neither a stop nor an 
arrest is a suspect free to leave.  As stated by the Jones court 
in considering at what point a stop becomes an arrest: 
 The test is not, as argued by [defendant], 
whether a reasonable person would have felt 
free to leave under the circumstances:  That 
concern marks the line between a fourth 
amendment seizure of any degree and a 
consensual encounter which does not require
 any minimal objective justification. 
  
759 F.2d at 637 (citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1762 (1984); United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 
1876-77 (1980)).  Clearly, a Terry stop is a seizure, Terry, 392 
U.S. at 16, 88 S. Ct. at 1877, and one seized is by definition 
not free to leave.  Of course, we distinguish the length of time 
a suspect may be detained before the detention becomes a full-
scale arrest, which we consider as a factor in evaluating the 
reasonableness of the detention as a whole in light of the 
circumstances.  Baker, supra, 1995 WL 125470, at *4. 
 Applying these considerations to the facts before us, 
we hold that the officers' stop and detention of Edwards did not 
rise to the level of an arrest.  The police acted reasonably in 
blocking the suspects' vehicle to conduct a brief investigation.  
  III. 
 We conclude that appellant was not arrested until 
Officer Crapello opened the manila envelope and formally arrested 
both suspects.  Moreover, because we find the police were within 
the bounds of Terry in stopping and frisking Edwards, we hold 
that the district court properly denied his motion to suppress 
the credit cards seized by police from the manila envelope in his 
possession.  Accordingly, we will affirm. 
